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INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Infant J (hereinafter J) was born in Shreveport,
Louisiana. 1 Shortly thereafter, Oren Adar and Mickey Ray
Smith, an unmarried same-sex couple residing in
Connecticut, traveled to Louisiana, where the child’s mother
agreed to give him up for adoption. 2 In April 2006, the Ulster
County Family Court in Kingston, New York approved the
adoption and issued an adoption decree declaring Adar and
Smith J’s legal parents. 3 The couple forwarded the adoption
decree to the Louisiana Registrar of Vital Records and
Statistics, requesting that the Registrar issue an amended
birth certificate for J. 4 This new birth certificate would
identify Adar and Smith as J’s legal parents. 5 The Registrar,
however, denied their request. 6
In a letter, Darlene W. Smith, the Louisiana State
Registrar (the Registrar), stated that since Louisiana law
does not authorize adoptions by unmarried couples, the
Registrar is unable to create a new birth certificate listing
both men’s names. 7 In 2007, Adar and Smith challenged the
Registrar’s refusal in a lawsuit against the Registrar in her
official capacity. 8 The couple alleged that the Registrar’s
refusal violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 9
Despite their legal attempts, Adar and Smith were
unsuccessful in receiving a court order requiring the
Registrar to issue an accurate birth certificate. 10 The couple’s
legal battle ended in October 2011 when the Supreme Court
of the United States denied Adar and Smith’s petition for writ
of certiorari. 11 To date, J does not have a birth certificate

1. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 639 F.3d
146 (5th Cir. 2011).
2. Brief of Appellant State Registrar Darlene W. Smith at 4–5, Adar, 597
F.3d 697 (No. 09-30036), 2009 WL 6027991 at *4–5 [hereinafter Brief of
Appellant].
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 6–7.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id.
7. See id.; Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (E.D. La. 2008).
8. Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 8; Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
9. Id.
10. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 162 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
11. Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
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listing both his parents’ names. 12
According to Lambda Legal, “An accurate birth certificate
is universally recognized, readily accepted, and often required
in many legal contexts,” including enrolling the child in
school, obtaining a social security card and passport for the
child, and claiming the child as a dependent for taxes. 13
Failing to have an accurate birth certificate denies a child
access to these rights and benefits, and compromises his or
her well-being. 14 In J’s case, having an inaccurate birth
certificate has hindered Adar and Smith’s ability to enroll J
in school and has “complicat[ed] Smith’s ability to enroll his
son on his company health plan.” 15 J is not the only child a
state registrar has denied an accurate birth certificate based
on the state’s disapproval of the parents’ marital status. 16
Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Virginia have also denied birth
certificates to children adopted out-of-state, i.e. outside the
state where the child was born, by unmarried same-sex
couples. 17
While these instances raise several questions under the
United States Constitution, 18 this Comment focuses solely on
the equal protection question. 19 Through the lens of Adar and
Smith’s case, this Comment addresses the unconstitutionally
unequal treatment of a subset of children adopted by
unmarried and/or same-sex couples. 20
Specifically, it
discusses the proper level of judicial scrutiny that courts
should apply in such cases and proposes necessary action
towards eliminating this unequal treatment.

12. See Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
13. Adar v. Smith Case Background, LAMBDA LEGAL (2011),
http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs_adar-v-smith-casebackground.pdf.
14. See Brief of Amici Curiae Joan Heifetz Hollinger et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith and in Support of
Affirmance at 8–9, Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-30036),
2010 WL 5778048 at *8–9, [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger].
15. Adar v. Smith Case Background, supra note 13.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (E.D. La. 2008); see also
Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007); Davenport v. LittleBowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 368 (2005).
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
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Part I of this Comment addresses the current landscape
of adoption and the adoption process in the United States. 21
It discusses in detail the Adar v. Smith case and summarizes
the necessary background information for evaluating equal
protection questions. 22 Part II identifies the equal protection
problem arising from a state registrar’s failure to issue an
accurate birth certificate to a particular group of adopted
children. 23 Part III analyzes the equal protection claim in
Adar v. Smith—specifically, it discusses the application of
intermediate scrutiny and the United States Supreme Court’s
rationale in illegitimacy cases. 24 Part IV proposes the level of
review courts should apply in evaluating state registrars’
refusal to issue accurate birth certificates to children adopted
by unmarried and/or same-sex couples. 25 In addition, Part IV
proposes attacking the discrimination against adopted
children of unmarried and/or same-sex couples by making
changes at the legislative level. 26
Joint adoption by unmarried couples, especially same-sex
couples, is becoming more prevalent. 27 Without proper action,
state registrars will continue to deny children adopted by
these couples the same rights and benefits of having an
accurate birth certificate that states grant to children adopted
by married couples, as well as all other children.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Adoption in the United States
1. Adoption Generally
For many children, especially those in foster care,
adoption is the “path to a safe, loving, permanent family.” 28
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.-E.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A.-B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.B.
See EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., EXPANDING RESOURCES FOR
WAITING CHILDREN II: ELIMINATING LEGAL AND PRACTICE BARRIERS TO GAY
AND LESBIAN ADOPTION FROM FOSTER CARE 13 (2008), available at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/2008_09_Expanding_Resources_L
egal.pdf.
28. Id. at 4.
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Adoption is the “[l]egal transfer of parenthood from one to
This “legal transfer of
another parent or couple.” 29
parenthood” completely terminates the “parental rights and
relations between the parent and child,” 30 and bestows on the
adoptive parent(s) all the rights of a legal parent. 31 For the
child, adoption confers certain benefits flowing from the
parent-child relationship. 32
Estimates show that roughly 120,000 children are
adopted each year in the United States. 33 Many of these
adoptions occur outside the foster care system, via private
domestic 34 or international adoptions. 35 Others take place
following a determination by a child welfare agency, such as
foster care, that a child will not be returning home to his or
her parent(s). 36 In 2009, an estimated 421,000 children were
in foster care. 37 Of those 421,000 children, about 114,000
were awaiting adoption, meaning their goal was adoption

29. Annette R. Appell, Legal Issues in Lesbian and Gay Adoption, in
ADOPTIONS BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: A NEW DIMENSION IN FAMILY
DIVERSITY 36, 37 (David M. Brodzinsky & Adam Pertman eds., 2012).
30. Id. An adoption also terminates the relations between the child and the
terminated parent’s family, including the “child’s siblings, grandparents, aunts,
uncles, and cousins.” Id.
31. See id.
32. See id. These benefits include the rights to inherit and to receive
survivor benefits and parental support. Id.
33. How Many People Choose Adoption, ADOPTION.COM, http://
adopting.adoption.com/child/how-many-people-choose-adoption.html
(last
visited Apr. 26, 2013).
34. Private domestic adoptions are adoptions in which the birthparents
select from several potential adoptive families the family in which they would
like their child to be placed. HARVEY J. MAKADON ET AL., THE FENWAY GUIDE
TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HEALTH 454 (2008).
35. GARY G. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY LESBIAN AND
GAY PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007), available at http://
www.urban.org/publications/411437.html.
36. Id.
37. U.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES,
TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION—FY 2002–FY 2011 at 1 (2012)
[hereinafter AFCARS TRENDS], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov
/programs/cb/resource/trends-in-foster-care-and-adoption.
According to the
Code of Federal Regulations, foster care is defined as “24 hour substitute care
for children outside their own home.” 45 C.F.R. app. A § 1355 (2012). Children
in foster care may live in “nonrelative foster family homes, relative foster homes
(whether payments are being made or not), group homes, emergency shelters,
residential facilities, and preadoptive homes.” CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION
GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2011, at 2 (2013), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/foster.pdf.
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and/or their parents had their parental rights terminated. 38
While quite a few children are awaiting adoption, this
number shows a substantial decline from the estimated
131,000 children that were awaiting adoption in 2000. 39
Researchers at the Urban Institute and the Williams
Institute of the UCLA School of Law speculate that the
decline is the result of the enactment of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997. 40 ASFA pressured states
to locate permanent homes for children in the foster care
system. 41 In addition, it “placed stricter timelines on agencies
to terminate parental rights.” 42 Following the enactment of
AFSA, the number of adoptions significantly increased. 43
Since 2000, the number of children in foster care that are
adopted has remained at roughly 50,000 per year. 44
In general, state law determines who may adopt. 45
Because there is no uniform adoption law, adoption practices
vary from state to state. 46 Historically, states preferred to
place children with married couples. 47 While adoption laws
have become more flexible, many states solely permit
adoptions by married couples or single unmarried adults. 48
Some states, however, do not permit unmarried couples to
adopt jointly. 49
Joint adoption allows parents not biologically related to a
child to simultaneously adopt a child. 50 Such adoptions allow
unmarried couples to adopt a child together. 51 In some states,
38. AFCARS TRENDS, supra note 37, at 1; see also GATES ET AL., supra note
35, at 1. In defining waiting children, the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis
and Reporting System (AFCARS) excluded children “whose parents’ rights have
been terminated, who are 16 years old and older, and who have a goal of
emancipation.” AFCARS TRENDS, supra note 37, at 2.
39. GATES ET AL., supra note 35, at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, in FAMILIES
BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 37, 37 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger
eds., 2004).
46. See id.
47. Appell, supra note 29, at 38.
48. Id. at 38, 39.
49. See id. at 39.
50. SEAN CAHILL & SARAH TOBIAS, POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER FAMILIES 24 (2010).
51. See id. In the 1980s, “lower courts in the San Francisco Bay Area began
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laws prohibiting unmarried couples from jointly adopting
affect opposite- and same-sex couples alike. 52 Currently,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and the District of Columbia
allow unmarried couples, including same-sex couples, to
adopt jointly. 53 In addition, California allows married samesex couples to adopt jointly, while Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont allow unmarried partners
who have civil unions to adopt jointly. 54 On the contrary,
Mississippi and Utah statutorily prohibit same-sex couples
from adopting. 55 Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin prohibit, via
case law, joint adoptions by same-sex couples. 56 The twentyeight unlisted states, however, fall somewhere between
explicitly permitting and prohibiting joint adoption by samesex couples. 57
2. Adoptions by Gay Men and Lesbians
Researchers at the Urban Institute and the Williams
Institute of the UCLA School of Law estimate that gay and
lesbian parents are raising “at least four percent of all
adopted children” in the United States; this equates to
roughly 65,000 children. 58 In addition, estimates show that
“over two million lesbian, gay or bisexual persons have an
interest in adopting.” 59 Reports show that gay men and
lesbians may be more willing than heterosexual adults may
be to adopt children with special needs. 60

granting same-sex couples the right to adopt children jointly and
simultaneously. Since then, courts have been allowing such adoptions more
frequently.” Id.
52. Appell, supra note 29, at 42.
53. EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supra note 27, at 20. In 2007,
Colorado signed HB 1330 into law; this law statutorily recognizes joint adoption
by unmarried couples, including same-sex couples. Id.
54. Id.
55. Appell, supra note 29, at 56.
56. Id. at 56–57.
57. Id. at 55–57.
58. EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supra note 27, at 5.
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id. at 5.
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3. Adoption Process and the Birth Certificate
Individuals who choose to adopt may do so domestically
or internationally. 61 In general, domestic adoptions are
broken down into two classifications, private or public
adoptions. 62 Private domestic adoptions are adoptions in
which the child’s birth parent(s) select the adoptive parents
with whom their child will be placed. 63 Such adoptions may
be done with the help of an intermediary, such as a lawyer. 64
Public domestic adoptions, on the other hand, are adoptions
completed through a state child welfare agency and “involve
the adoption of children who have been placed in the custody
of the agency.” 65 Private or public agencies that have custody
over a child usually do so through “a voluntary
relinquishment or an involuntary termination of the birth
parents’ rights.” 66
Individuals interested in adopting are not required to
adopt a child who resides in the same state in which they
reside. 67 Interstate adoption allows for the adoption of a child
who lives in a state other than the state in which his or her
adoptive parent(s) reside. 68 The Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children (ICPC) governs such adoptions. 69
Every state in the United States is a member of this
compact. 70 The compact’s purpose is to “ensure protection
and services to children who are placed across state lines for
foster care or adoption.” 71
While the adoption process varies depending on the type
of adoption and the state in which the adoption takes place,
all adoptions must be certified and finalized by the court. 72
The court finalizes the adoption through a court order or
61. MAKADON ET AL., supra note 34, at 454.
62. See id. at 454–55.
63. Id.; see also Hollinger, supra note 45, at 37.
64. Hollinger, supra note 45, at 37.
65. MAKADON ET AL., supra note 34, at 454–55.
66. Hollinger, supra note 45, at 37.
67. See Interstate Adoption, ADOPTION.COM, http://encyclopedia.adoption
.com/entry/interstate-adoption/197/1.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS’N, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON
THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 3 (2002), available at http://icpc.aphsa.org/Home
/Doc/Guidebook_2002.pdf.
72. See Hollinger, supra note 45, at 37–39.

WEST FINAL

8/12/2013 11:25 AM

2013] EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE ADOPTED

971

adoption decree. 73 A judge will usually sign and issue an
adoption decree as long as the necessary prerequisites for
adoption are satisfied and the adoption is in the best interest
of the child. 74 The decree establishes the legal relationship
between the child and his or her adoptive parent(s) 75 and
severs the legal relationship between the child and his or her
biological parents. 76 The decree also guarantees that the
adoptive parent(s) “will be treated as parents for all legal
purposes including custody, the authority to enroll the child
in school, participate in health-care decision-making, travel
with the child, and receive benefits for and through the child,
and impart benefits to the child.” 77 After the court has
entered the decree and “the time for challenging it passed, the
adoption cannot be challenged, ignored, or revoked.” 78 In
general, “governmental agencies, courts, and other states
ought to recognize these [adoption] decrees as establishing for
all legal purposes the parenthood of the adults named in the
decree.” 79
Once the court finalizes an adoption, the state or county
office responsible for issuing birth certificates usually seals
the child’s original birth certificate and issues an amended
birth certificate reflective of the legal parent-child
relationship created by the adoption decree. 80 Prior to 1930, a
state did not amend a child’s birth certificate upon completion
of an adoption. 81 In 1930, however, states began issuing new
birth certificates upon a child’s adoption; these new birth
certificates replaced the birth parents’ names with the
adoptive parents’ names. 82
Today, every state requires by law that the state issue,
upon receipt of a certified copy of an adoption decree, new
birth certificates to adopted children who were born in that
state. 83 The new birth certificate keeps the information
73. See id. at 38.
74. See id.
75. Appell, supra note 29, at 50.
76. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 163 (2004).
77. Appell, supra note 29, at 50.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 51.
81. Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History
of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376 (2001).
82. Id.
83. Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 6–7. All fifty states
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regarding the child’s birth date and place of birth, and
replaces the names of the child’s birth parent(s) with the
names of the child’s adoptive parent(s). 84 This new birth
certificate carries the “same legal effect and serves the same
functions” as all other valid birth certificates. 85
Each individual state is responsible for registering a
child’s birth via a birth certificate. 86 The registration of a
child’s birth serves as a “permanent and official record of the
existence of a person before the law.” 87 The birth certificate is
a document the state issues to an individual as proof of the
state’s registration of the individual’s birth. 88 The certificate
includes the child’s name and date of birth, as well as the
child’s “parents’ names, dates and places of birth, [and]
nationality.” 89 The state government vital records office for
the state in which the individual is born is responsible for
issuing the birth certificate. 90 While this certificate serves as
proof of the child’s birth, it also serves as the child’s legal and
personal identification. 91
The birth certificate is “universally recognized as reliable
proof of a child’s identity and parentage.” 92 Both “public and
private entities require the submission of a birth certificate to
verify a child’s legal parentage in virtually every
circumstance in which parentage must be shown.” 93 For
example, a birth certificate is required to enroll a child in
school and to establish the child’s emergency contacts. 94
have adopted some form of Article 3, Part 8 of the proposed Uniform Adoption
Act of 1994. Id. at 7. The Act provides that “upon receipt of a certified decree of
adoption from another jurisdiction, the state registrar shall issue a new birth
certificate for an adoptee born in that state.” Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See How Do I Order a Birth, Death, or Marriage Certificate?, HHS.GOV,
http://answers.hhs.gov/questions/3245 (last updated Aug. 31, 2009).
87. CLAIRE CODY, PLAN LIMITED, COUNT EVERY CHILD: THE RIGHT TO
BIRTH REGISTRATION 10 (2009), available at http://plan-international.org/aboutplan/resources/publications/campaigns/count-every-child/.
88. Id.
89. CLAIRE CODY, PLAN LIMITED, supra note 87, at 10; see also Brief of Amici
Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 7.
90. How Do I Order a Birth, Death, or Marriage Certificate, supra note 86.
91. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 6–9.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id. at 8. These entities include schools, welfare departments, financial
institutions, the Social Security Administration, and the Veterans
Administration. See id. 8–9.
94. Id. at 8.
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Furthermore, a birth certificate is “required to establish who
is authorized to sign for medications distributed by the school
nurse or to make emergency medical decisions for a child.” 95
An individual is also generally required to show a copy of
a child’s birth certificate where he or she is conducting legal
and financial transactions on behalf of a minor, for example
opening up a bank account for a child. 96 In addition, a birth
certificate is required in instances where a child inherits from
extended family. 97 Furthermore, the U.S. Social Security
Administration requires a child’s birth certificate when
Moreover,
applying for survivor benefits for a child. 98
companies usually require a birth certificate in order to
collect the proceeds from insurance policies in which a child is
a named beneficiary, as well as “to verify a child’s entitlement
to a parent’s pension or other retirement benefits.” 99
Generally, a birth certificate is also required to acquire a
passport for a minor child. 100 Beginning April 1, 2011, the
U.S. Department of State requires certified birth certificates
offered by passport applicants as primary evidence of
citizenship to include, among other things, the full names of
applicants’ parent(s). 101 The Department of State, however,
will not accept as evidence of citizenship certified birth
certificates lacking this information. 102
B. Adar v. Smith
According to Adar and Smith, under Louisiana law, 103
“when a child born in the state is adopted in another state,
the child’s adoptive parents are entitled to obtain a new
Louisiana birth certificate for their child listing them as the
child’s parents.” 104 In 2006, pursuant to this statute, Adar
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
22 C.F.R. § 51.42(a) (2011); New Requirement for U.S. Birth Certificates,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/passport/passport_5401.html (last
updated Apr. 28, 2011).
102. See New Requirement for U.S. Birth Certificates, supra note 101. An
individual, however, may submit secondary evidence in the event that he or she
cannot satisfy subsection (a). 22 C.F.R. § 51.42(b).
103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2011).
104. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011)
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and Smith, an unmarried same-sex couple, requested a new
birth certificate for their adopted child J. 105 The Louisiana
State Registrar, however, denied the couple’s request. 106
In 2007, Adar and Smith filed suit against the Registrar
in her official capacity in the Eastern District of Louisiana for
her refusal to issue an accurate birth certificate identifying
both Adar and Smith as J’s legal parents. 107 The couple
requested that the court enter an injunction requiring the
Registrar to issue a birth certificate identifying both Adar
and Smith as J’s parents. 108 The couple’s complaint alleged
that the Registrar’s refusal to issue an accurate birth
certificate violated both the Full Faith and Credit Clause109
and the Equal Protection Clause 110 of the U.S. Constitution. 111
Adar and Smith’s equal protection claim alleged that the
Registrar, in refusing to issue accurate birth certificates to
children adopted by unmarried couples, denies a class of
adopted children the same rights available to children
adopted by married couples. 112 Furthermore, Adar and Smith
contended that the Registrar’s refusal penalizes children
adopted by unmarried parents based on their parents’ marital
status. 113 According to Adar and Smith, the Registrar’s policy
called for the court to apply heightened scrutiny, the same
level of review applied by the United States Supreme Court in
illegitimacy cases. 114 Under this level of review, Adar and
Smith argued that the Registrar’s policy violated the Equal
(No. 11-46), 2011 WL 2689011 at *2.
105. See Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (E.D. La. 2008).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
provides, in relevant part, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1. Adar and Smith’s full faith and credit claim specifically
argued that the Constitution requires the Registrar to enforce the New York
adoption decree and issue an amended birth certificate “without regard to
Louisiana’s public policy.” Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
110. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall deny any person equal
protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
112. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
113. Brief of Appellees Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith at 54, Adar, 597
F.3d 697 (No. 09-30036), 2009 WL 6027996 at *54 [hereinafter Brief of
Appellees].
114. Id.
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Protection Clause. 115
In response, the Registrar argued that its actions did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it was simply
upholding and enforcing Louisiana law. 116 Under Louisiana
adoption law, only married couples may jointly adopt. 117
Louisiana’s policy is based on its preference for providing
adopted children the stability of having married parents. 118
According to the State, Louisiana birth certificate law flows
from its policy favoring adoption by married couples. 119 As a
result, the Registrar could not issue a birth certificate listing
both parents’ names. 120 The Registrar further maintained
that her enforcement of Louisiana laws did not deprive Adar
and Smith of their rights and did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 121
In 2008, U.S. District Court Judge Jay Zainey ruled
against the Registrar, finding that her actions violated the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 122 In his decision, Judge Zainey
did not address the equal protection claim because Adar and
Smith were entitled to summary judgment on their full faith
and credit claim. 123 The court subsequently entered judgment
ordering the Registrar to issue an accurate birth certificate
identifying both Adar and Smith as J’s parents. 124
The state appealed the district court ruling, and in 2010,
a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed the district court’s decision. 125 Again,
the court did not address the equal protection claim. 126 The
115. See id. at 54–55.
116. See Brief in Opposition at 23–24, Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011)
(No. 11-46), 2011 WL 4048833 at *23–24.
117. Id. at 23.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 23–24.
122. Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (E.D. La. 2008). The court held
that Louisiana’s out-of-state adoption statute authorizes the state registrar to
issue a birth certificate upon receipt of a valid adoption decree, even if
Louisiana adoption law would not permit the adoption. Id. at 863. The court
further found that the Registrar’s arguments that her discretion to issue a new
birth certificate is limited lacked merit. Id.
123. Id. at 862 n.8.
124. Id. at 864.
125. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 639 F.3d
146 (5th Cir. 2011).
126. See id. at 720 n.76.
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Registrar petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en
banc. 127 The court granted the petition and vacated the panel
decision. 128 After reviewing the case, the en banc court
reversed and remanded the case to the district court for
“entry of a judgment of dismissal” of Adar and Smith’s
claims. 129 In its decision, the court held that the Registrar did
not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 130 In addition,
the court held that Louisiana’s birth certificate law did not
deny equal protection to adopted children of unmarried
couples. 131
The court based its denial of the equal protection claim
on two grounds. First, the court disagreed that “the law
discriminates on the basis of illegitimacy—and that it
therefore triggers heightened scrutiny—because Infant[] J’s
birth status is irrelevant to the Registrar’s decision.” 132
Second, the court found that “Louisiana’s distinction between
married and unmarried adoptive couples furthered its
legitimate interest in encouraging a stable and nurturing
environment for the education and socialization of its adopted
children.” 133 This interest, the court held, provides a rational
basis for Louisiana’s adoption law and its corresponding birth
certificate policy. 134
C. Similar Cases
Several other courts have addressed contests regarding
the issuance of accurate birth certificates to children adopted
in states other than the one in which they were born. In
Davenport v. Little-Bowser, three same-sex couples filed suits
asking the court to compel the Virginia Registrar of Vital
Records and Health Statistics to issue accurate birth
certificates to their adopted children. 135 While the children
were born in Virginia, the couples adopted them in

127. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 161.
131. See id. at 162.
132. Brief in Opposition, supra note 116, at 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
133. Id. at 7, 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See id.
135. Appell, supra note 29, at 51.
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Washington, D.C. 136 The Virginia Registrar denied the
couples’ requests because, under Virginia law, “birth
certificates can only list the name of a mother and a father”—
i.e., Virginia does not permit same-sex couples to jointly adopt
in Virginia. 137
Similarly, in Perdue v. Mississippi State Board of Health,
a Mississippi trial court addressed a case in which Mississippi
refused to issue a new birth certificate to a four-year-old boy
adopted by a lesbian couple. 138 The child was born in
Mississippi but adopted by Cheri Goldstein and Holly Perdue
in Vermont. 139 The state denied the couple’s request because
same-sex couples may not jointly adopt children in
Mississippi. 140
Lastly, in Finstuen v. Crutcher, Oklahoma government
officials refused to issue accurate birth certificates reflecting
“the adoptions for three same-sex parent adoptive families.” 141
The couples filed suit in response to an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the state from recognizing adoptions “by more
than one individual of the same sex from any other state or
foreign jurisdiction.” 142 As a result, Oklahoma categorically
rejected a class of out-of-sate adoption decrees. 143
D. The Equal Protection Clause and Equal Protection
Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 144 In
essence, the clause requires the government to treat each
individual equally, 145 but “does not require every law to be
136. Id.
137. Id. at 51–52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Goldstein Perdue v. Mississippi State Board of Health: Mississippi
Punishes Four Year Old Because He Has Lesbian Moms, LAMBDA LEGAL (Oct.
25, 2001), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/ga_20011025_goldstein-perdue-vms-state-board-of-health.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Appell, supra note 29, at 52.
142. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See id.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex
Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 897
(2000).
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equally applicable to all individuals.” 146 Equal protection
issues arise when a law discriminates against or
disadvantages a class of individuals, or “impinge[s] upon the
exercise of a fundamental right.” 147
In evaluating equal protection cases, courts apply one of
three levels of review or scrutiny. 148 The level of review
applied differs depending on the type of classification. 149 The
rational basis test is the lowest level of review. 150 At a
minimum, all laws challenged under the equal protection
clause must survive rational basis review. 151 Under this test,
a court will uphold a law so long as it is “rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose.” 152
The middle level of review is intermediate scrutiny. 153 In
general, courts apply intermediate scrutiny in cases dealing
with discrimination based on gender or illegitimacy. 154 Under
intermediate scrutiny, a court will uphold a law so long as it
is “substantially related to an important government
purpose.” 155 In essence, the means used by the government
“must have a ‘substantial relationship’ to the end being
sought.” 156
The highest level of review is strict scrutiny. 157 Under
strict scrutiny, a court will uphold a law so long as it is
“proved necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.” 158 In general, courts apply strict scrutiny in cases
where the government discriminates based on “race or
national origin,” or where the government impinges upon a
fundamental right. 159

146. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 59–60
(1971).
147. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
148. Hedges, supra note 145, at 897.
149. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
150. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
672 (3d ed. 2006).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
154. Id.
155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 671; see also Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
156. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 671.
157. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
158. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 671.
159. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 671.
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E. United States Supreme Court Decisions Addressing
Classifications of Nonmarital Children
Historically, children born out of wedlock or conceived
prior to marriage 160—i.e., nonmarital or illegitimate
children—“suffered
significant
legal
and
societal
discrimination.” 161 At common law, nonmarital children were
denied many of the same rights available to marital children,
including the “right to inherit from or through a parent” and
to receive parental support and government benefits. 162 Since
1968, 163 the United States Supreme Court has held laws
denying nonmarital children rights and benefits based on the
state’s disapproval of their parents’ actions to be
unconstitutional. 164
In one such case, Clark v. Jeter, 165 the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania state law that “required
a nonmarital child to establish paternity within six years of
birth” before the child could seek support from his or her
father. 166 The state law permitted marital children to seek
support from their parents at any time, but limited the time
during which a nonmarital child could do the same. 167 The
Court reasoned that “the six-year limitations period was
impermissible because financial needs may not emerge until
later and because it did not offer the child a sufficient
opportunity to present his or her own claims.” 168
The Court’s decision in Clark articulated intermediate
scrutiny as the level of review applied to discriminatory
classifications based on nonmarital status. 169 In such cases,
the court will uphold “statutory distinctions between marital
160. KRAUSE, supra note 146, at 10–11.
161. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 346 (2011).
162. Id. at 346–47.
163. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Levy
v. Louisiana a law that denied illegitimate or nonmarital children the right to
file a wrongful death suit and recover losses resulting from a mother’s death.
Hedges, supra note 145, at 898; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 678.
The law permitted marital children to sue but did not permit nonmarital
children to do so. Id.
164. See Maldonado, supra note 161, at 351.
165. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
166. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 777; see also Clark, 486 U.S. at 457.
167. Clark, 486 U.S. at 457.
168. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 777.
169. Id.; see also Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
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and nonmarital children so long as they [are] ‘ substantially
related to permissible state interests.’ ” 170 For the Supreme
Court, penalizing children because of the marital status of
their parents is not substantially related to a permissible
state interest. 171
The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding nonmarital
children’s rights share several common themes:
children are not responsible for the circumstances of their
birth or for the legal status or conduct of their parents; . . .
children of unmarried parents deserve as much legal and
economic protection as other children; and . . . states may
not seek to influence the behavior of adults by penalizing
their children. 172

While the Supreme Court has utilized these common
themes to invalidate laws discriminating against nonmarital
children, it has also utilized them to invalidate a Texas law
that discriminated against undocumented aliens. 173 In Plyler
v. Doe, 174 the Court held unconstitutional “a Texas law that
provided a free public education for children of citizens and of
documented aliens, but required that undocumented aliens
pay for their schooling.” 175 According to the Court, “[e]ven if
the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults
by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus
of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not
comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.” 176
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
In Adar v. Smith, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
addressed whether denying an accurate birth certificate to
children adopted by unmarried couples violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 177 The issue arose in the context of the
Louisiana Registrar’s refusal to provide an accurate birth
170. Maldonado, supra note 161, at 352 (quoting Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,

265 (1978)).

171. See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 11–12; see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 777.
172. Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 12.
173. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 775–76.
174. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
175. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 775 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 206).
176. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra
note 14, at 18.
177. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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certificate to J, a child born in Louisiana but adopted out-ofstate by an unmarried couple. 178 The Louisiana Registrar
denied the couple’s request based solely on the couple’s
unmarried status. 179
This particular issue is not unique to Adar and Smith, or
to Louisiana. 180 In several other states, state registrars have
denied accurate birth certificates to children adopted by
unmarried and/or same-sex couples through interstate
adoption. 181 As a result, these states have denied these
children the same rights and benefits of having an accurate
birth certificate enjoyed by children adopted by married
couples. 182 This unequal treatment raises the question as to
whether the failure to extend equal rights to a class of
children adopted by unmarried couples violates the Equal
Protection Clause. In addition, it poses the question as to
what level of review courts should apply in analyzing these
questions.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF ADAR V. SMITH AND
PROPOSED APPLICATION OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
A. Birth Certificate
A birth certificate plays a crucial role in a child’s life. 183
It serves not only as the child’s primary form of personal
identification, but entitles him or her to various benefits. 184
Failing to provide a child with an accurate birth certificate
denies the child access to these benefits, and compromises his
or her “safety and well being.” 185 In the instance of an
emergency, any problem or delay in verifying a parent’s legal
status may place the child’s health or life at risk. 186 The risk
is especially present where “parental consent for medical
treatment of a child is required.” 187 Health care personnel,
such as doctors and nurses, both “expect and accept birth
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 149.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 4–5.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 14.
See id. at 7–8.
See id. at 7–9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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certificates as proof of legal parentage.” 188 Not having an
accurate birth certificate could delay treatment. 189
Although other means of proving parentage exist, such as
the adoption decree, requiring a child to produce his or her
adoption records prevents the child from keeping his or her
adoption confidential. 190 Furthermore, a child may become
upset or embarrassed if he or she has to explain who his or
her parentage, as well as his or her adoption. 191 Having an
accurate birth certificate prevents such occurrences from
happening and protects the child’s privacy. 192
The Louisiana Registrar’s policy against issuing birth
certificates with both parents’ names to children adopted by
unmarried couples has already presented various obstacles
for Adar and Smith. 193 In particular, not having a birth
certificate with both parents’ names has complicated “Smith’s
ability to enroll his son on his company health plan,
imped[ed] the couple’s ability to enroll their son [in] school,
and result[ed] in the couple being stopped at an airport when
airport personnel wanted proof of their relationship with the
child.” 194 Unfortunately, the family will continue to face such
obstacles so long as the Registrar denies their request for an
accurate birth certificate.
B. Equal Protection Analysis of the Louisiana Registrar’s
Policy
The Louisiana Registrar’s policy denies children adopted
by unmarried couples the same rights available to children
adopted by married couples. 195 Under the Louisiana “Record
of Foreign Adoptions” statute, “the State Registrar shall
provide a new birth certificate showing the names of the
adoptive parents to a Louisiana-born child who is adopted
out-of-state upon presentation of a properly certified copy of
the other state’s final decree of adoption.” 196 The statute,
however, does not address whether the couple adopting must
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 8–9.
See id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Adar v. Smith Case Background, supra note 13.
Id.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 4.
Id. at 5.
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be married. 197 Despite this, the Registrar issues accurate
birth certificates to children adopted by married couples, but
does not for children adopted by unmarried couples. 198 The
Registrar contends that it cannot issue an accurate birth
certificate to a child adopted by unmarried parents because
Louisiana does not permit unmarried couples to jointly adopt
and its birth certificate laws flow from this policy. 199 The
Registrar’s policy, however, violates the Equal Protection
Clause by denying a class of adopted children the same rights
available to other adopted children. 200
The Registrar’s policy against issuing accurate birth
certificates to a class of adopted children is constitutionally
indistinguishable from the laws the Supreme Court
invalidated in illegitimacy cases. 201 The Supreme Court has
traditionally held that unequal treatment of nonmarital
children “based on the conduct or status of their parents
violates the Equal Protection Clause.” 202 According to the
Court, “no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as unjust—way of
deterring the parent . . . .” 203 Similarly, a child has no control
over his or her adoption, including whether his or her adopted
parents are unmarried. 204 Therefore, penalizing the adopted
child is also an ineffectual and unjust way of deterring
unmarried parents from adopting or of expressing
By singling out and
disapproval of such conduct. 205
penalizing a class of adopted children, the Registrar violates
the Equal Protection Clause in the same way as those
statutes that denied benefits to illegitimate children. 206 The
Registrar’s policy, like the laws challenged in illegitimacy
cases, should be analyzed using intermediate scrutiny. 207
197. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2011).
198. See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 7.
199. Id. at 16; see also Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
200. Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 14.
201. Id.
202. Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 53; see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Hollinger, supra note 14, at 11–12.
203. Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 54 (quoting Picket v. Brown, 462
U.S. 1, 7 (1983)).
204. Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 15.
205. Id.
206. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 113, at 54.
207. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit wrongly concluded that intermediate
scrutiny does not apply to cases involving discrimination
against children adopted by unmarried couples. According to
the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
illegitimacy cases focus on the child’s illegitimate birth
status. 208 Because “J’s birth status [was] irrelevant to the
Registrar’s decision,” 209 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
Supreme Court’s illegitimacy cases could not “support the
conclusion that Infant J belong[ed] to a suspect classification
protected by heightened scrutiny.” 210 The Fifth Circuit,
however, ignored the Supreme Court’s rationale for applying
intermediate scrutiny in cases discriminating against
nonmarital children—a state cannot penalize children for
their parents’ status or conduct because children are not
responsible for their parents’ status or conduct. 211 Statutes
that penalize children on these grounds do not bear a
substantial relationship to a permissible state interest. 212 In
addition, the Fifth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court’s
extension of this rationale, as well as intermediate scrutiny,
to a case not addressing discrimination based on a child’s
illegitimate birth status. 213 In Plyer v. Doe, 214 the Supreme
Court invalidated a Texas law that denied free public
education to children of undocumented immigrants. 215 The
Court held that a state could not impose disabilities on
children of undocumented immigrants because of their
parents’ status. 216
Under Supreme Court precedent, the Registrar’s policy
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny.
To survive
intermediate scrutiny, a law must be “substantially related to
an important government purpose.” 217 The Registrar’s policy
serves no such purpose. 218 The Registrar’s policy penalizes a
class of children for circumstances they cannot control—their
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 162 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
See id.; Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 13.
Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 14.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 104, at 34.
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 775.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 776.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 671.
Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 14–15.
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parent’s marital status. 219 The Registrar contends that its
policy does not penalize adopted children of unmarried
parents, but rather “simply expresses a preference that
children be adopted by married parents.” 220 According to the
Registrar, “a marriage provides a more stable basis for
raising children together than relationships founded on
something other than marriage.” 221 However, the Supreme
Court has held that “encouraging marriage [is] not a
permissible justification” for denying nonmarital children
specific rights. 222
Furthermore, the Registrar’s policy against issuing birth
certificates to children adopted by unmarried couples serves
no legitimate purpose because it operates only after the
adoption has taken place. 223 “The Registrar’s policy has no
effect on who may adopt a child born in Louisiana, nor can it
affect the validity of adoption laws or decrees from other
states.” 224 Rather, the Registrar’s policy denies an accurate
birth certificate to a class of children already adopted. 225
In addressing the equal protection question in Adar v.
Smith, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc wrongly held that the
Registrar’s policy does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Had the court applied intermediate scrutiny, it could
not have rationally concluded that the Registrar’s policy is
substantially related to a legitimate government purpose. 226
The Registrar’s policy has no relationship to its birth
certificate law. 227 Rather, it penalizes a subset of adopted
children for their parents’ status. 228 Such discrimination
serves no legitimate purpose, and therefore violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 229

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 17.
See id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 14.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 15.
See id. at 14.
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. Courts Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis
Courts addressing the denial of accurate birth certificates
to children adopted by unmarried and/or same-sex couples
should apply intermediate scrutiny. Cases such as Adar deny
children adopted by unmarried parents equal rights solely
based on their parents’ marital status. 230 Similarly, cases
such as Davenport, Finstuen, and Perdue deny children
adopted by same-sex couples equal rights solely based on
their parents’ sexual orientation. 231 The Supreme Court,
however, has repeatedly held that penalizing a child for the
status or conduct of his or her parents is wrong. 232 Children
adopted by unmarried and/or same-sex parents cannot
change, and are not responsible for, the status of their
parents. 233 Despite this, state registrars continue to penalize
this class of adopted children. 234 As a result, children adopted
by unmarried parents continue to be disadvantaged and
exposed to unnecessary risk. Applying intermediate scrutiny
will ensure that a class of adopted children is no longer
treated differently than all other adopted children.
B. Additional Proposal: Remedying the Problem Outside the
Courts
While
applying
intermediate
scrutiny
attacks
discrimination against children adopted by unmarried and/or
same-sex couples at the judicial level, society should take
steps outside the courtroom to remedy this problem. State
registrars denying accurate birth certificates to children
adopted by unmarried and/or same-sex couples are doing so
based on disapproval of the parents’ marital status and/or
sexual orientation. 235 Enacting legislation at the state and
federal level prohibiting discrimination against unmarried
and/or same-sex couple adoption will attack the root of this
problem.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
I.C.

See id. at 4.
See supra Part I.C.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 4, 13.
See id.
See generally Appell, supra note 29, at 51–52.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 4; see supra Part
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Current estimates show that 401,000 children in the
United States are in foster care. 236 Of this 401,000, over
104,000 are awaiting adoption. 237 While there is no shortage
of children waiting for adoption, “there is a shortage of
qualified individuals willing to adopt or foster a child in the
child welfare system.” 238 Estimates show that approximately
two million gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals are interested in
adopting a child. 239 State laws precluding unmarried and/or
same-sex couples from adopting keep children in need of
homes and individuals willing to adopt from becoming
families. 240
States should therefore enact legislation that allows
unmarried and/or same-sex couples to adopt, or, alternatively,
that “bars the exclusion of applicants for adoption solely on
the basis of [marital status and/or] sexual orientation.” 241
Child welfare advocates at the state and national level should
work together to add such language to state adoption laws. 242
Legislators are taking steps to enact such legislative
change at the federal level.
Former United States
Representative Pete Stark introduced before Congress the
Every Child Deserves a Family Act in October 2009. 243 The
bill withholds federal government funding from “states that
discriminate against prospective adoptive or foster parents
based on marital status, sexual orientation and gender
identity.” 244 The goal of the bill is to “open more homes to
foster children” by eliminating “sexual orientation, gender
identity, and marital status discrimination and bias in
adoption and foster care recruitment, selection, and
placement procedures.” 245 On May 3, 2011, a committee held
a hearing on the issues presented in the bill. 246 Passing
legislation like the Every Child Deserves a Family Act will
236. AFCARS TRENDS, supra note 37, at 1.
237. Id.
238. Every Child Deserves a Family Act, H.R. 1681, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)
(2011).
239. EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supra note 27, at 13.
240. See H.R. 1681 § 2(a)(10)(A).
241. EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supra note 27, at 20.
242. Id.
243. Adoption, UNMARRIED EQUALITY, http://www.unmarried.org/parentschildren/adoption/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
244. Id.
245. H.R. 1681 § 2(a)(2).
246. Adoption, supra note 243.
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only help in taking the necessary steps to end discrimination
against adopted children based solely on the status of their
parents.
CONCLUSION
The state registrars with policies against issuing
accurate birth certificates to children adopted by unmarried
and/or same-sex couples deny this group of adopted children
the same rights available to children adopted by married
parents. 247 The policies penalize the child for a status that
the child cannot change. 248 Just as a child cannot control his
or her birth, he or she has no control over the adoption. 249
This makes such cases indistinguishable from illegitimacy
cases, in which the Supreme Court has already held that the
state cannot penalize a child for the status or conduct of his
or her parents. 250
The only remedy for courts is to apply intermediate
scrutiny. Had the Fifth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny
in Adar v. Smith, it would have concluded that the Registrar’s
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. 251 Other courts
applying the same level of review will find that similar
policies fail under the same terms. Therefore, the necessary
judicial course of action is to apply intermediate scrutiny so
children in similar situations as J will not have to suffer the
same burdens.
Furthermore, while courts can attack such discrimination
by utilizing intermediate scrutiny, states and welfare
agencies can attack the problem by enacting legislation
directed at prohibiting discrimination in adoption based on
marital status, sexual orientation, or gender identity. 252 Such
legislation would serve to make unlawful the very basis for
state registrars’ discrimination against children adopted by
Removing the
unmarried and/or same-sex couples. 253
legislative barriers against unmarried and same-sex joint
247. See Brief of Amici Curiae Hollinger, supra note 14, at 4.
248. See id. at 15.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 14.
251. See id.
252. See Every Child Deserves a Family Act, H.R. 1681, 112th Cong. (2011);
see also EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., supra note 27, at 19–20.
253. See id.
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adoption may encourage more couples to provide loving
homes for children in need. 254

254. See H.R. 1681.

